Universities War

Z-plasticity of social fabric.
What scientists understood while studying the “new reality” in Russia

February 24, 2022 is a date that divid­ed the lives of mil­lions of peo­ple into before and after. Millions of Ukrainians became refugees, hun­dreds of thou­sands of Russians were forced to leave the coun­try, thou­sands of peo­ple became polit­i­cal pris­on­ers. Schools and uni­ver­si­ties have been invad­ed by Z-ide­ol­o­gy. This gave rise to a new Russian real­i­ty, which more than 75 soci­ol­o­gists, his­to­ri­ans, demog­ra­phers and econ­o­mists who par­tic­i­pat­ed in the con­fer­ence tried to com­pre­hend  “Academic Bridges” lab­o­ra­to­ries.

Classification of fugitives

How, after two years, do researchers in var­i­ous sci­en­tif­ic dis­ci­plines con­tin­ue to work in today’s con­di­tions, includ­ing both those who left and those who remain in Russia? How do you man­age to main­tain your sci­en­tif­ic spe­cial­iza­tion and real­ize your sci­en­tif­ic inter­ests in con­di­tions of emi­gra­tion for some and iso­la­tion for oth­ers? The par­tic­i­pants of the round table “Russian teach­ers and sci­en­tists on both sides of the bor­ders after 02.22.24” tried to answer these questions.

To under­stand what hap­pened to the emi­grat­ed sci­en­tists, Nikolai Petrov, a vis­it­ing researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, shared with the audi­ence the results of a study in which about 50 respon­dents liv­ing in Germany (half of the sam­ple), Great Britain, USA, Balkan countries.

The most suc­cess­ful relo­cants were young sci­en­tists (grad­u­ate stu­dents, young candidates):

“They know not only for­eign lan­guages well, but also for­eign method­ol­o­gy, and eas­i­ly inte­grate into insti­tu­tions,” explains Nikolai Petrov. “They are young, not yet bur­dened with a fam­i­ly, which means they are not both­ered by every­day prob­lems. They are built into the glob­al world and can be eas­i­ly repurposed.

The sec­ond cat­e­go­ry is “young fugi­tives,” young peo­ple who left, run­ning away either from mobi­liza­tion or from war. They did not have a pre­pared place where they could study for grad­u­ate school or work. Often this group urgent­ly trav­eled to any visa-free coun­tries from where they were already look­ing for a place to live. Representatives of this group, as a rule, do not have a long-term con­tract. They move from one short-term grant to anoth­er, some­times chang­ing not only cities and uni­ver­si­ties, but also countries.

The third cat­e­go­ry is “famous pro­fes­sors”, well-known sci­en­tists with estab­lished con­nec­tions, at the peak of their careers. They are often helped by for­eign col­leagues. But this is help for six months to a year, with no prospect of con­tract exten­sion. At the same time, they have a fam­i­ly, which means their every­day prob­lems are more acute. Because of the accu­mu­lat­ed cap­i­tal, it is already dif­fi­cult for them to change their spe­cial­iza­tion, but it is also dif­fi­cult to find a place in their specialization.

The fourth is “old­er fugi­tives.” These are usu­al­ly polit­i­cal­ly active researchers and aca­d­e­mics who have faced admin­is­tra­tive pres­sure. They are often forced to flee with­out pre­vi­ous­ly pre­pared ground. They have con­nec­tions and a name. But usu­al­ly they are not good at get­ting involved in the work of Western uni­ver­si­ties or NGOs.

The fifth is employ­ees of the same team who moved togeth­er (Carnegie Center, Sakharov Group, etc.). A big plus of such a move is the already exist­ing core of the team. But find­ing new finances for the work of the entire team is more difficult.

The sixth cat­e­go­ry is “Westerners,” peo­ple who have long worked in Western uni­ver­si­ties on short or medi­um-term con­tracts. On the one hand, it’s eas­i­er for them: they already had expe­ri­ence work­ing and liv­ing abroad. On the oth­er hand, before they did not have the ques­tion of grow­ing into Western aca­d­e­m­ic life.

Representatives of all groups believe that they have great­ly ben­e­fit­ed moral­ly by chang­ing coun­tries. In pro­fes­sion­al terms, most of the groups con­sid­er them­selves to have won, except for the “elder­ly run­aways” and the teams that left. Socially, only “Westerners” do not con­sid­er them­selves lost. The rest feel like they have lost, and lost bad­ly. Financially, all groups lost: no one feels finan­cial­ly more sta­ble and secure.

Nikolay Petrov drew atten­tion to the fact that the loss­es of one per­son and the loss­es of sci­ence as a whole often do not coin­cide. The relo­ca­tion of spe­cial­ists often leads to either a per­son chang­ing their field of activ­i­ty com­plete­ly or being forced to change top­ics. From such actions, accord­ing to Petrov, each indi­vid­ual spe­cial­ist may ben­e­fit, but sci­ence as a whole los­es. And not only the Russian one, which is los­ing spe­cial­ists, but also the Western one - pbe­cause it is deprived of ana­lyt­i­cal resources in Russia, which helped to qual­i­ta­tive­ly col­lect and ana­lyze information.

Without borders and without affiliation

The top­ic of sci­en­tif­ic emi­gra­tion from Russia was con­tin­ued by Alexander Abashkin, asso­ciate researcher at the Davis Center, Harvard University, asso­ci­a­tion coor­di­na­tor Scholars Without Borders. He told the audi­ence about the “Scientists Without Borders” project. The project appeared lit­er­al­ly three months after the start of the war. And ini­tial­ly he sought to help sci­en­tists from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus leave and find work. The authors of the project paid spe­cial atten­tion to the pos­si­ble move to the coun­tries of the post-Soviet space: Central Asia and the Caucasus, adap­ta­tion to which is much softer.

Work in this area almost imme­di­ate­ly revealed sev­er­al impor­tant prob­lems. For exam­ple,the salaries that uni­ver­si­ties were ready to offer were insuf­fi­cient for those arriv­ing. These were the aver­age salaries of the teach­ing staff of the cor­re­spond­ing uni­ver­si­ty, but due to the sharp increase in hous­ing rental prices, this amount was sore­ly lack­ing for relo­cants. In addi­tion, the authors of the project could not even approx­i­mate­ly esti­mate the num­ber of sci­en­tists in need of their help. To bet­ter under­stand the sit­u­a­tion on the ground, the authors inter­viewed about three thou­sand sci­en­tists (dis­trib­ute The ques­tion­naire was helped by such famous blog­gers as Ekaterina Shulman and Sergey Medvedev).

According to this sur­vey, 72% of those who left are spe­cial­ists 25-45 years old, 22% are 45-60 years old, and the gen­er­a­tion over 60 years old accounts for only 4%. 60% of sci­en­tists par­tic­i­pat­ing in the sur­vey work in the field of human­i­ties and social sci­ences (soft sci­ence), 40% of respon­dents work in exact sci­ences (hard sci­ence). More than a thou­sand respon­dents had a can­di­date of sci­ence degree at the time of the sur­vey, 168 had a doc­tor­ate, 165 had a PhD, many wrote that at the time of depar­ture they were study­ing in grad­u­ate school, but did not have time to defend them­selves. Among the respon­dents were many for­mer teach­ers from Higher School of Economics, Moscow State University, and St. Petersburg State University. This means we can talk about the depar­ture of the aca­d­e­m­ic elite.

You can help sci­en­tists not only by pro­vid­ing a vacan­cy. Currently, with­in the frame­work of the project, many meet­ings are orga­nized on issues that are rel­e­vant to relo­cants. For exam­ple, sem­i­nars on writ­ing arti­cles for for­eign sci­en­tif­ic jour­nals, includ­ing from the edi­tors of such jour­nals, advice and sup­port in writ­ing a resume and search­ing for cur­rent vacan­cies, cours­es to improve the lev­el of English. Another prob­lem that the Scientists Without Borders project helps with is the prob­lem of lack of affil­i­a­tion among sci­en­tists who have left. The project has an agree­ment with a num­ber of uni­ver­si­ties that are ready to pro­vide their affil­i­a­tion (but with­out pro­vid­ing salaries or real employment).

“We are not a research project,” empha­sizes AlexanderAbashkin. — But we reg­u­lar­ly con­duct sur­veys in our telegram chan­nel, which allows us to bet­ter assess the situation.

According to recent sur­veys, 47% of respon­dents con­tin­ue to work in their spe­cial­ty, and 31% had to leave sci­en­tif­ic work, 13% com­bine work in their spe­cial­ty with anoth­er, 9% work in a relat­ed field fields of sci­ence. It is inter­est­ing that 38% of those who left con­tin­ue to com­mu­ni­cate with their remain­ing col­leagues only through per­son­al cor­re­spon­dence (this per­cent­age coin­cides with the answers of sci­en­tists locat­ed in Russia). For 24%, com­mu­ni­ca­tion was inter­rupt­ed (in Russia, only 14% believe that com­mu­ni­ca­tion with col­leagues who left was inter­rupt­ed); 15% main­tain con­tact, but the remain­ing col­leagues hide this from man­age­ment (among respon­dents in Russia, this answer was cho­sen by 28%). 23% main­tain rela­tions offi­cial­ly, with the knowl­edge of man­age­ment (in Russia the answer is 20%).

“I am ashamed that I am a representative of this country”

The report of Anna Kuleshova, head of the Social Foresight Group, co-founder of the asso­ci­a­tion Social Researchers Without Borders, chair­man of the Council on the Ethics of Scientific Publications, was devot­ed to how sci­en­tists inside Russia see the situation.

As it turned out, a sig­nif­i­cant part of her respon­dents did not note rad­i­cal changes in their work: they are not under direct pres­sure, sci­en­tif­ic work on many top­ics is still pos­si­ble, there is suf­fi­cient fund­ing, uneth­i­cal actions are not direct­ly forced. At the same time, an increase in self-cen­sor­ship and vol­un­tary rejec­tion of top­ics that could poten­tial­ly car­ry risks (anti-war sen­ti­ment, LGBT, etc.) were not­ed. But even here, sci­en­tists find an oppor­tu­ni­ty to con­tin­ue their research, for exam­ple, replac­ing “gen­der stud­ies” with “male and female stud­ies”, etc.

Changes are felt more strong­ly in large met­ro­pol­i­tan uni­ver­si­ties than in region­al ones; dis­missals, non-renew­al of con­tracts, etc. are more com­mon there. However, the opin­ions of the sur­veyed sci­en­tists dif­fer in their assess­ment of the state of the aca­d­e­m­ic com­mu­ni­ty: some believe that it is destroyed, the lev­el of sys­temic trust has sharply decreased and every­one has their own micro­cosm Others, on the con­trary, said that they felt like-mind­ed peo­ple in their col­leagues, who were also against the war and also decid­ed to stay in the coun­try. One of the respon­dents, who chose to stay in Russia and con­tin­ue teach­ing human­i­ties, emphasizes:

— There is a lay­er of peo­ple who stayed here, who do not walk the streets with slo­gans for obvi­ous rea­sons (you can’t go far with a slo­gan). But these peo­ple have a cer­tain influ­ence on their audi­ence. And this is impor­tant. And even if the audi­ence fol­lows such peo­ple to the cre­ma­to­ri­um, then they arrive as peo­ple, not as bru­tal­ized creatures!

The avail­abil­i­ty of sci­en­tif­ic infor­ma­tion among sur­vey par­tic­i­pants does not yet cause acute con­cern. They use Google Scholar, ResearchGate, etc. to access sci­en­tif­ic arti­cles. In extreme cas­es, per­son­al con­nec­tions and let­ters to for­eign col­leagues or com­pa­tri­ots who have gone abroad with a request to share the lat­est arti­cle help.

Many said that con­nec­tions with for­eign col­leagues at the indi­vid­ual lev­el were pre­served, empha­siz­ing that for­eign col­leagues often clear­ly dis­tin­guish between the posi­tions of the rec­tors who signed the let­ter in sup­port of the SVO and the opin­ions of spe­cif­ic sci­en­tists . Many rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Russian aca­d­e­m­ic com­mu­ni­ty con­tin­ue to trav­el to for­eign con­fer­ences (often in the sta­tus of an inde­pen­dent researcher, if they do not want to declare a Russian uni­ver­si­ty as their place of work). Post-Soviet and Asian coun­tries have also become pop­u­lar areas of inter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion (but in a num­ber of cas­es, respon­dents drew atten­tion to the imi­ta­tive nature of such coop­er­a­tion). Some stopped going to European con­fer­ences, cit­ing the fact that they were ashamed:

“I’m ashamed that I’m a rep­re­sen­ta­tive of this coun­try, I don’t want to catch judg­men­tal glances, even if there won’t be many of them, but they will be,” Anna quotes the words of one of the respondents.

A sep­a­rate ques­tion is how to pub­lish and cite arti­cles by for­eign agent sci­en­tists. Concerns were often expressed that such a pub­li­ca­tion could soon be regard­ed as the influ­ence of a for­eign agent or as aid­ing a for­eign agent, which would neg­a­tive­ly affect the fate of the journal/​scientific team. Respondents are also con­cerned about the unpre­dictabil­i­ty of this sta­tus: today you are writ­ing an arti­cle with a col­league, tomor­row he or she wrote some­thing on Facebook, the co-author was declared a for­eign agent, and then a joint arti­cle was pub­lished in print. How (and is it nec­es­sary?) to insure against this? At the same time, many hope that the abil­i­ty to speak Aesopian lan­guage, cul­ti­vat­ed in Soviet times, can pro­tect them from the sta­tus of a for­eign agent.

Most often, prob­lems with pub­li­ca­tions, accord­ing to respon­dents, arise from Western uni­ver­si­ties, which do not allow sci­en­tists who have left to pub­lish in Russian sci­en­tif­ic jour­nals under new affil­i­a­tions or take on col­leagues with Russian affil­i­a­tions in co-authors.

Boris Knorre, Russian reli­gious schol­ar, can­di­date of philo­soph­i­cal sci­ences, asso­ciate pro­fes­sor at the Higher School of Economics and the Higher School of European Cultures at the Russian State University for the Humanities, believes that the sit­u­a­tion in Russian sci­en­tif­ic insti­tutes and uni­ver­si­ties is more seri­ous than it might seem from his speech Anna. For exam­ple, in reports on RAS grants, pub­li­ca­tions in pub­li­ca­tions in “unfriend­ly coun­tries” may not be tak­en into account. In addi­tion, Boris him­self faced a taboo against a cer­tain point of view, in par­tic­u­lar, crit­i­cism of the Russian Orthodox Church. A crit­i­cal look at the church was not wel­comed even before 2022: grants were not sup­port­ed, work was not tak­en into account:

“They may not be pun­ished for this, but such projects are not fund­ed, and there­fore are not includ­ed in aca­d­e­m­ic activ­i­ties,” not­ed Boris.

Summarizing the results of the round table, its mod­er­a­tor Andrey Yakovlev, one of the founders of HSE, researcher at the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg, not­ed that the sit­u­a­tion in the human­i­ties and social sci­ences is dif­fer­ent from the nat­ur­al sci­ences. In addi­tion, a sci­en­tist in Russia is still high­ly depen­dent on the posi­tion of the lead­er­ship of a par­tic­u­lar insti­tute or uni­ver­si­ty. According to his obser­va­tions, if man­age­ment does not strive for career growth, but strives to main­tain a high lev­el of sci­en­tif­ic pro­duc­tion, it turns a blind eye to active con­tacts with for­eign col­leagues. Such insti­tutes are sym­pa­thet­ic to vaca­tions at their own expense and trips to con­fer­ences abroad.

New course - old basics

How edu­ca­tion has changed over the pasttwo years, dis­cussed at the round table “History and moder­ni­ty in the new edu­ca­tion­al space.”

Maria Tretyakova, senior lec­tur­er, can­di­date of his­tor­i­cal sci­ences, spoke about how the course “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood”, which is new to Russian uni­ver­si­ties, is taught. She shared her obser­va­tions of what teach­ers report­ed at var­i­ous events to exchange expe­ri­ence in teach­ing this course.

According to VTsIOM, who stud­ied the atti­tude towards the new sub­ject among Russian cit­i­zens, 68% of respon­dents con­sid­er this course impor­tant. True, as Maria not­ed, most like­ly, some of the respon­dents are not famil­iar with the course. The most skep­ti­cal atti­tude towards the course, accord­ing to this sur­vey, is among stu­dents aged 18-24 (only 5% con­sid­er the course important)

The researcher draws atten­tion to out­landish (for Russian uni­ver­si­ties) meth­ods rec­om­mend­ed in the cor­re­spond­ing man­u­al: intel­lec­tu­al games, per­for­mances, immer­sive per­for­mances, per­for­mances, com­pe­ti­tions, etc. That is, the cre­ators of the course tried to involve stu­dents as much as pos­si­ble and move away from the tra­di­tion­al lec­ture-sem­i­nar scheme. Maria judges how teach­ers imple­ment­ed the rec­om­men­da­tions of the ini­tia­tors of cre­at­ing the course based on sev­er­al dozen reports from both indi­vid­ual uni­ver­si­ties and gen­er­al con­fer­ences. Among the test­ed meth­ods are video and audio mate­ri­als, joint view­ing of Soviet films, trips to muse­ums, etc.

“The most impor­tant con­clu­sion that can be drawn is that uni­ver­si­ties are active­ly striv­ing to report on get­ting into the trend,” says Tretyakova. — One gets the feel­ing that the­mat­ic con­fer­ences are being start­ed for this purpose. 

The ques­tion remains what actu­al­ly hap­pens in classrooms. 

But, in my opin­ion, teach­ers who are com­mit­ted to career growth or who are patri­ot­ic active­ly imple­ment the pro­gram. So, as is often the case with any course, a lot depends on the indi­vid­ual teacher.

“They cheated us again!”

Konstantin Pakhalyuk, Candidate of Political Sciences, affil­i­at­ed researcher at the Post-Soviet Conflict Research Program (PSCRP) at the Center for Strategic Studies, spoke in his report about how his­to­ry becomes a means of jus­ti­fy­ing the present. Begin-Sadat. In his opin­ion, his­to­ry has become one of the val­ue lan­guages of the Russian gov­ern­ment since the mid-2000s. And one of the rea­sons for using this lan­guage is its under­stand­abil­i­ty and acces­si­bil­i­ty. At the same time, you can talk about any­thing in this lan­guage. With the begin­ning of the SVO, the sit­u­a­tion changed, the Russian author­i­ties moved from dia­logue to mono­logue, in which, accord­ing to Pakhalyuk, there is a process of alien­ation from reality.

In the new text­books, Konstantin sees sev­er­al impor­tant prin­ci­ples on which they are built. Firstly, Russia is always a state. The his­to­ry of Russia is the his­to­ry of the state, the his­to­ry of state bod­ies. Konstantin points out that when Putin talks about Ukraine, he does not call it a state, it is a “ter­ri­to­ry.” The uni­fied his­to­ry text­book, echo­ing the pres­i­dent, about the events of the Civil War or rev­o­lu­tion that do not occur on the ter­ri­to­ry of mod­ern Russia, writes that they occur “on the nation­al out­skirts.” It turns out that in 1919 Poland was the nation­al out­skirts of Russia!

— In the his­to­ry of the state there were rulers, there were ter­ri­to­ries and there were peo­ple, but there is no soci­ety in the new text­books! The extra-state and inde­pen­dent are exclud­ed from his­to­ry. In Medinsky’s text­book there is only one illus­tra­tion about sci­ence - Tsiolkovsky’s draw­ing. There are no pho­tographs from the life of soci­ety. But there are 11 dif­fer­ent por­traits of Stalin, 8 of Lenin, posters, paint­ings of social­ist real­ism, cer­e­mo­ni­al pho­tos of heroes of var­i­ous wars - this is the visu­al image of the era.

Secondly, the Russian gov­ern­ment is always right. As an exam­ple, the sci­en­tist cites a descrip­tion in a text­book of the Stalinist peri­od of the 1930s: indus­tri­al­iza­tion, col­lec­tiviza­tion, agri­cul­tur­al devel­op­ment. A small para­graph is devot­ed to repres­sion: unfor­tu­nate­ly, this hap­pened, the costs of rapid growth. And the para­graph ends with the words: “Even those who were repressed con­tributed to the devel­op­ment of the coun­try, which helped it win the Great Patriotic War.” Pakhalyuk points out par­al­lels in the textbook’s rhetoric regard­ing Stalin’s time and the government’s posi­tion towards mod­ern Russians: “You don’t have to do any­thing. You are patri­ots sim­ply because you didn’t leave!”

The third through line in the his­to­ry text­book, marked­said by the speak­er - a ter­ri­ble insult to everyone.

— “In the First World War, Russia won a lot, a lot, and the allies staged an inter­ven­tion, which led to the Civil War,” Konstantin retells the text­book. — Nothing is real­ly explained about the Western con­ces­sion of the 20s. It is only writ­ten that the Junkers did not ful­fill its oblig­a­tions. (In 1923, the German com­pa­ny Junkers received a 30-year con­ces­sion to the Russo-Balt plant in Fili, com­mit­ting to pro­duce 300 air­craft per year. In three years, the com­pa­ny cre­at­ed only about 100 Yu-20 and Yu-21 air­craft, unsuit­able for com­bat appli­ca­tion. The con­ces­sion was liq­ui­dat­ed, but the aban­doned draw­ings allowed the USSR to start pro­duc­ing its air­craft - edi­tor’s note) We were cheat­ed again! And so prac­ti­cal­ly the whole story.

The text­book describes the par­ti­tion of Poland before World War II with no less bias. It appears in the pub­li­ca­tion only in the 20s, about which it is writ­ten that Poland annexed west­ern Ukraine and west­ern Belarus. After a few para­graphs, read­ers will learn that Stalin returned these territories.

“However, Lvov was nev­er part of the Russian Empire,” the speak­er notes. - How did we “return” him?

And the most trag­ic and unpleas­ant pages of Soviet his­to­ry, such as repres­sions or dis­pos­ses­sion, are lim­it­ed in the text­book to mea­ger facts or semi-mythol­o­giza­tion. Much of this is true for uni­ver­si­ty text­books on “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.” In one of them, for exam­ple, it is said about Yekaterinburg that it is a city with a rich his­to­ry: the Koptyakov cul­ture, Arkaim, Ermak and the Kyshtym dis­as­ter. It would seem that these are in no way con­nect­ed his­tor­i­cal events, but with this pre­sen­ta­tion, all of them, accord­ing to Konstantin, are per­ceived semi-mytho­log­i­cal­ly, equal­ly far from a school­childor stu­dent.

The sci­en­tist does not see much advan­tage in the seem­ing­ly thought-pro­vok­ing ques­tions “What do you think about…”. There is not a sin­gle fact in the text­book that would prompt an alter­na­tive opinion.

“We are not subjective!”

Sergey Chernyshov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, inde­pen­dent researcher, founder and for­mer direc­tor of NovoCollege began his report with the philo­soph­i­cal ques­tion “Does the school shape soci­ety (and then it is sub­jec­tive) or does soci­ety shape school (and then we can’t have any ques­tions about the school)?”

Teachers who teach “Conversations about Important Things” and line up chil­dren in the let­ter Z, accord­ing to Sergei’s expe­ri­ence, explain their behav­ior to them­selves sim­ply: we are small peo­ple, noth­ing depends on us, we are not sub­jec­tive and we are under oppres­sion. But at the same time, as the speak­er notes, no one could tell him where exact­ly the sys­tem of oppres­sion begins. Is the deputy direc­tor putting pres­sure or is he “under pres­sure”? And the direc­tor? Sergei recalled that on the Dachau memo­r­i­al there is a quote from Theodor Adorno writ­ten in five lan­guages: “The impos­si­bil­i­ty of repeat­ing Auschwitz should be the main require­ment for any edu­ca­tion.” Sergei admit­ted that this is why two years ago he expect­ed sub­jec­tiv­i­ty from the school.

“Back then it seemed to me that our entire school was built on imi­ta­tion, decep­tion, that you couldn’t make a fist out of jel­ly,” he says. — The scale of evo­lu­tion that the Russian school has under­gone can be assessed using spe­cif­ic exam­ples. When in April 2022, Tomsk jour­nal­ists found out that a sin­gle “Conversations about Important” man­u­al was being dis­trib­uted to schools, it was a fed­er­al sen­sa­tion, and the Department of Education of the Tomsk Region was forced to jus­ti­fy itself. It was some­how shy and awk­ward. Now no one should be ashamed of this; the rec­tors of lead­ing uni­ver­si­ties signed all the nec­es­sary let­ters in ear­ly March — no one’s eyes even twitch!

The speak­er got the impres­sion that the Russian edu­ca­tion sys­tem has no core at all, that it is ready for lit­er­al­ly anything.

— If you tell teach­ers tomor­row that chil­dren need to be stabbed with pitch­forks, the only ques­tion they will have is: “Should they bring the pitch­forks with them or will they give them out?” - says Chernyshov. 

— Why do they do this? Probably for the sake of a career. In the Novosibirsk region, an incon­spic­u­ous teacher trav­eled to the Donbass and became the direc­tor of a large col­lege. And the cur­rent Minister of Education, Maria Zhafyarova, appoint­ed in 2023, used to be the cura­tor of the region in Donbass, “spon­sored” by the Novosibirsk region, she her­self trav­eled to the occu­pied ter­ri­to­ries many times and orga­nized intern­ships for teach­ers from the “DPR” in Novosibirsk.

As anoth­er pos­si­ble rea­son, the speak­er admits resent­ment: teach­ers are final­lyfelt them­selves need­ed by the state. According to all sur­veys (offi­cial and unof­fi­cial), teach­ers in Russia are car­ri­ers of a rather tra­di­tion­al­ist pater­nal­is­tic ide­ol­o­gy, in which, if not specif­i­cal­ly the top­ic of war, then the idea of ​​inten­si­fy­ing edu­ca­tion­al work and pro­mot­ing “tra­di­tion­al val­ues” is an absolute good. But the speak­er does not have a defin­i­tive answer to this “why.”

Chernyshov found only one study about the influ­ence of SVO on stu­dents and school­child­ren dur­ing two years of war. Doctor of Sociological Sciences Vladimir Smirnov and his team sur­veyed 1,400 peo­ple from 15 Russian uni­ver­si­ties. The major­i­ty of stu­dents sur­veyed were indif­fer­ent to the top­ic of SVO. The sec­ond find­ing in the study is a decrease in trust in the state. And the third con­clu­sion is that SVO has led to a sharp polar­iza­tion of young peo­ple, stu­dents are either strong­ly for or strong­ly against. Sergey him­self con­clud­ed from the study that the pro­pa­gan­da of SVO in uni­ver­si­ties did not direct­ly influ­ence the world­view of stu­dent youth (and in this it is a fraud), but it def­i­nite­ly worked, since stu­dents began to think about it and become polar­ized against this background.

What awaits Russian schools after the end of the war can be judged from the his­to­ry of post-war Germany. There, the school, as Sergei notes, also did not become a dri­ver of change: the peri­od of the Nazi dic­ta­tor­ship was either hushed up or pre­sent­ed as a long-past past that does not direct­ly con­cern school­child­ren. Only in 1973, on the ini­tia­tive of the Federal Chancellor of Germany, work with his­tor­i­cal mem­o­ry began. And it start­ed from afar. The first top­ic for the com­pe­ti­tion of his­tor­i­cal projects for school­child­ren was the rev­o­lu­tion of 1848, then the November rev­o­lu­tion of 1918. And only in 1980 the top­ic “Daily life dur­ing the Nazi regime before the Second World War” was offered to German school­child­ren. This exam­ple sets the time frame for elim­i­nat­ing the con­se­quences of the inva­sion of Z-ide­ol­o­gy into the edu­ca­tion­al space of Russia.

“It’s best to zig from the sofa”

Evgeny Nasyrov, deputy edi­tor-in-chief of T-invari­ant, spoke about three exam­ples of the z-move­ment in uni­ver­si­ties. Student z-move­ment at Moscow State University rais­es mon­ey for ammu­ni­tion, drones, tech­ni­cal equip­ment for the PTSD Team. Participants in the move­ment bring the pur­chased cars to per­fec­tion and take them to the front line. The orga­ni­za­tion is head­ed by broth­er and sis­ter Andrey and Maria Trutnev, chil­dren of Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Yuri Trutnev, and, accord­ing to Evgeniy, the uni­ver­si­ty in this case does not so much ini­ti­ate the move­ment as it does not inter­fere with the activists.

He is much more active­ly involved in the life of the stu­dent z-move­ment “White Raven” at the Higher School of Economics. As an offi­cial stu­dent orga­ni­za­tion “White Raven” par­tic­i­pates in grant com­pe­ti­tions, sem­i­nars, trips, etc.

Another char­ac­ter­is­tic ini­tia­tive was an attempt to cre­ate a z-orga­ni­za­tion “Russian House of RUDN University” by Dmitry Sidorov, a fam­i­ly mem­ber high-rank­ing diplo­mats and tele­com elite. But it has­n’t end­ed yet. Tired of fight­ing with his native uni­ver­si­ty, Dmitry joined the “White Raven” move­ment and heads exter­nal rela­tions there.

— Studying these cas­es and infor­ma­tion from oth­er uni­ver­si­ties, we came to the con­clu­sion that it is dif­fi­cult to mea­sure the real lev­el of stu­dent sup­port for z-ide­ol­o­gy, admits Evgeniy. 

—Most uni­ver­si­ties do not have any war or war sup­port mate­r­i­al on their web pages. Once a month they exhaust them­selves with the clas­sic tri­ad of “net­works-can­dles-let­ters”, which is how they report. The most skill­ful ones, for exam­ple, Togliatti State University or the already men­tioned Moscow State University, craft old cars, turn­ing them into “armored loaves.” I am sure that there are those among stu­dents who see such pro­mo­tions as an oppor­tu­ni­ty for rapid career growth. But I guess that most stu­dents per­ceive SVO as some­thing that has noth­ing to do with their lives.

Dmitry Dubrovsky (CISRUS), com­ment­ing on the speech of Evgeny Nasyrov, drew atten­tion to the fact that many uni­ver­si­ties have their own Russian houses.

— They, of course, are nation­al­ists, con­ser­v­a­tives, Orthodox, they have their own stormy patri­ot­ic agen­da with the restora­tion of the names of the real heroes of Russia, but there,“As far as I can see, there is noth­ing about the cur­rent war,” Dmitry notes. — It turns out that there is some kind of, albeit not very stormy, patri­ot­ic life, but at the same time this is not z-patriotism.

In July 2023, Yuri Trutnev took the ini­tia­tive to cre­ate a patri­ot­ic move­ment at every uni­ver­si­ty under the threat of dis­missal of vice-rec­tors for edu­ca­tion­al work. In the opin­ion of Evgeniy Nasyrov, this rather indi­cates the pas­siv­i­ty of uni­ver­si­ties and a lack of inter­est in z-move­ments. But in the future, accord­ing to Evgeniy, Russian high­er edu­ca­tion will see an increase in the involve­ment of stu­dents in the z-move­ment. A new gen­er­a­tion has grown up, which Evgeniy calls the “Shaman gen­er­a­tion.” Their for­ma­tion took place dur­ing the “fierce years of pro­pa­gan­da.” For them to become z-patri­ots, the state, accord­ing to Nasyrov, only needs to ful­fill sev­er­al con­di­tions. Do not declare mobi­liza­tion (“it’s best to zig­ging from the couch”), attract as wide a mass­es as pos­si­ble (to work in the occu­pied ter­ri­to­ries, to par­tic­i­pate in var­i­ous con­fer­ences, for exam­ple, this year there will be an International Conference on Social Sciences in Mariupol) and use the nat­ur­al inter­est of young peo­ple in new tech­nolo­gies (by active­ly encour­ag­ing the emer­gence of drone con­trol cir­cles, you can eas­i­ly obtain the required num­ber of drone oper­a­tors, who can be eas­i­ly draft­ed into the army if necessary).

This is why, accord­ing to Nasyrov, it is impor­tant to try to answer in advance the ques­tion of what Russia could become with a gen­er­a­tion that has nev­er lived with­out Putin.

Concluding the con­fer­ence, Alexander Kukalev, an employ­ee of the Berlin Institute of Systems Biology, a mem­ber of the Academic Bridges lab­o­ra­to­ry team, not­ed that when study­ing the new social real­i­ty of Russia, it is impor­tant to remem­ber that it can­not be con­sid­ered the norm, you can’t get used to it. And aca­d­e­m­ic reflec­tion is one of the most reli­able ways of sober­ly assess­ing it.

Text: Yulia Chernaya

  22.04.2024

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